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The capital adequacy requirements for banks, enshrined in international banking regulations, are
based on a fallacy of composition—namely, the notion that an individual firm can choose the
structure of its financial liabilities without affecting the financial liabilities of other firms. In prac-
tice, capital adequacy regulations for banks are a way of forcing nonfinancial companies into debt.
“Enforced indebtedness” then reduces the quality of credit in the economy. In an international
context, the present system of capital adequacy regulation reinforces this indebtedness. Proposals
for “dynamic provisioning” to increase capital requirements during an economic boom would
simply accelerate the boom’s collapse. Contingent commitments to lend to governments in the
event of private-sector lending withdrawals, alongside lending to foreign private-sector borrowers,
are a much more viable alternative.
“Enforced Indebtedness”
Since the 1980s, conventional wisdom has it that banks can be made more secure by having cap-
ital that is sufficient to meet a decline in the quality of their assets (loans or bonds). This think-
ing was reflected in the Basel Accord of 1988, which lay down minimum capital requirements in
relation to the supposed riskiness of assets. Apart from the fact that there is considerable uncer-
tainty about the precise riskiness of assets, the strategy of securing bank stability by enforcing cap-
ital adequacy is based on a fallacy of composition: what is good for one bank is not necessarily
good for all banks taken together. Essentially, the strategy is based on a microeconomic pre-
sumption that each bank can determine its liabilities (i.e., the
scale and distribution of its liabilities between deposits and cap-
ital) without affecting the liabilities of other banks and firms in
the economy. This is a fallacy, because the process of issuing
capital or liabilities is subject to two constraints. The first of these
is the balance sheet constraint—that is, one bank’s (or firm’s)
liability is another bank’s (or firm’s) asset. Secondly, even if one
assumes that the price system (i.e., the return offered and
accepted on liabilities and assets) will allow all banks and firms
to issue the kind of liabilities that they wish to have on their
individual balance sheets, there is no guarantee that their assets
will generate sufficient income to allow each individual bank or
firm to make the payments on those liabilities.
In practice, banks cannot determine their capital without
affecting the availability of capital for other economic enter-
prises. If we exclude the possibility of bank holding companies
and bank capital cross-holdings (see below), the current supply
of capital in the financially advanced markets of the OECD
countries is principally determined by the cash flow and respec-
tive liability structures of other financial intermediaries (e.g.,
pension funds and insurance companies). Given a certain capac-
ity on the part of other nonbank financial intermediaries for
purchasing equity, a regulatory requirement to increase bank
capital reduces the amount of capital available to nonfinancial
firms. If nonfinancial firms are unable to secure the amount of
equity capital that they need, they are obliged to raise capital
through the issue of debt instruments in the form of corporate
bonds or company paper. In this way, stabilizing banks by rais-
ing capital requirements becomes a way of “forcing” companies
into debt.
The “enforced indebtedness” of companies is a crucial fac-
tor in bringing about financial crisis and recession. Both the
1929 stock market crash and the crash of 2007–08 were pre-
ceded by rising capital issues by financial intermediaries and the
growing indebtedness of nonfinancial firms. The response of
nonfinancial firms to rising levels of debt is to reduce their
(productive) investment in fixed capital. Such falls in fixed cap-
ital formation are a key factor in bringing about recession in the
real (nonfinancial) economy, and, in the case of the 1930s (or
Japan after 1992), extending recession into economic stagna-
tion and depression.
The “crowding out” of the nonfinancial business sector’s
demand for capital also raises the cost to them of the capital
they eventually raise. Because banks have to satisfy a capital reg-
ulatory requirement, they are willing to pay whatever price it
takes to get the capital onto their books. This “inelastic”
demand for capital means that banks may end up promising a
higher return on the capital they raise. Nonfinancial firms wish-
ing to raise equity capital must then match or offer even higher
returns on the capital they wish to issue. This is reflected in the
rising yields on corporate equity issues since 2000.
The other way in which banks can accommodate demands
for higher capital ratios (i.e., ratios of capital to assets) is by
securitization—that is, by packaging bank loans as bonds and
then selling those bonds to other financial intermediaries
(insurance companies and pension funds). This raises banks’
capital/asset ratios by reducing the amount of risky assets on
the banks’ balance sheets. Securitization has recently had bad
press because of its role in the “business model” of failed banks
such as Northern Rock. But there is another channel by which
securitization has contributed to financial fragility: through the
sale of loan-backed bonds to other financial intermediaries.
Such sales effectively reduce the pool of capital that nonfinancial
firms can raise in the markets. This is another means of “forc-
ing” companies into debt.
These considerations apply to the issue of bank capitaliza-
tion through the sale of equity capital to financial institutions
such as insurance companies and pension funds. The sale of
equity capital to private individuals is not an effective means of
raising capital because few individuals are wealthy enough to be
able to hold significant quantities of capital on the scale required
by banks.However, there is yet another method for raising bank
capital; namely, by establishing bank holding companies, or
cross-holdings of bank capital. A bank could issue equity capi-
tal that might be held by a holding company financed mostly
with debt instruments, such as bonds. Alternatively, two banks
could agree to issue capital to each other. The holding company
method is a way of creating capital that is really debt, and this
would show up in consolidated accounts. Moreover, it is a
highly speculative form of financing, since the holding com-
pany ends up with financial commitments that must be serv-
iced out of less liquid assets whose value and income are much
less certain that the holding company’s liabilities. This is why, in
the past, bank holding companies were strictly regulated. The
second method gives rise to a “layering” of capital within the
financial system, with banks holding other banks’ capital in
their asset portfolios. Such cross-holdings have adverse effects
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on interbank competition, on bank efficiency, and on the vul-
nerability of banks grouped in this way to any risks that might
affect the assets of any one of them.
“Enforced indebtedness” increases the financial fragility of
the economy. Firms that would have preferred to finance them-
selves with equity capital find themselves holding levels of debt
over their planning horizon that they would prefer to reduce.
They can accommodate this excess debt in one of two ways.
Firms can hold larger amounts of liquid assets (bank deposits,
foreign currency deposits, or short-term bills), but this means
that capital they have issued is “wasted” by being held as finan-
cial assets, rather than being applied productively to the expan-
sion of output or fixed capital. Alternatively, firms can reduce
their fixed capital investment in order to build up those liquid
assets. Either way, productive investment ends up being less
than it would otherwise be. If sufficient firms succumb to
indebtedness in this way, the economy moves to a lower growth
trajectory. Fixed capital formation is a key factor in the liquid-
ity of firms, with higher investment in fixed capital by the busi-
ness sector as a whole being associated with higher profits
retained by individual firms. Lower investment in fixed capital
therefore reduces the liquidity of firms and their ability to serv-
ice their debts. Indirectly, the company indebtedness enforced
by raising capital requirements for banks may itself cause a
decline in the quality of bank assets.
The Business Cycle and Variable Capital
Requirements
Looking at this issue over the course of the business cycle, it is
easy to see how regulatory bank capital requirements may make
fluctuations in economic activity that much more extreme.
Given even moderate business fluctuations, it is prudent for
nonfinancial firms to raise additional equity capital as a boom
proceeds, because the longer the boom lasts, the closer the
eventual recession, and the more likely a fall in the return on the
firms’ productive assets. If, however, banks are increasing their
issue of equity capital, then nonfinancial firms may find them-
selves unable to issue additional equity or rely on debt finance.
In this way, when the recession comes, it is made worse by the
greater indebtedness of companies. In a recession, the returns
on all assets, including those in bank portfolios, deteriorate. To
ensure their survival, nonfinancial firms should now be con-
verting debt into equity. But since the deterioration of their
assets is obliging banks to raise more equity capital themselves,
this bank capitalization reduces the already diminishing pool of
equity capital available to nonfinancial firms.
There have been recent proposals to stabilize bank balance
sheets by requiring banks to raise the capital-to-risk-weighted-
assets ratios over the course of an economic boom. The present
fixed capital-to-risk-weighted-assets ratio is procyclical in the
sense that, in the course of an economic boom, the liquidity and
net worth of balance sheets increase. A fixed capital ratio would
therefore fail to discourage banks’ risky lending and may even
encourage it, because the risks would be less apparent in a boom.
The policy of requiring banks to raise capital ratios as a boom
proceeds is sometimes referred to as “dynamic provisioning.” 
There are three objections to this approach. In the first
place, the risks that are supposed to evoke higher capital ratios
are rather nebulous, and evidenced only by defaults in a reces-
sion (if it comes), so that it becomes difficult to enforce higher
capital ratios if the boom is prolonged and defaults appear to be
reduced. 
Secondly, the approach would require banks to drain the
available pool of equity capital even more rapidly than under
fixed capital ratios, causing a corresponding greater indebted-
ness on the part of companies and further forcing up the cost of
capital that nonfinancial firms could issue. Far from stabilizing
banks and the economy, dynamic provisioning would destabi-
lize the economy and the credit system, including banks, by
indebting companies more rapidly in a boom or by discourag-
ing company investment, and by these means increasing the
risk of companies’ defaulting on their debt. 
The third problem arises in an international setting in
which some banks may have a diversified portfolio of assets
spread across countries, some of which are in a boom and some
of which are in recession. Such banks would on balance have a
much more stable portfolio of loans and could reasonably
argue that they should not be required to increase their capital
ratios as much as banks exposed only to countries in recession.
A far more effective form of dynamic provisioning would
be to require companies (and households with mortgages, if we
are to extend our considerations to household debt) to increase
their equity capital as a boom proceeds. This would make com-
panies’ remaining debt more manageable in the face of a reces-
sion, and thereby reduce the probability of default on that debt.
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International Bank Stabilization
The arguments presented here apply to the international econ-
omy insofar as national financial systems are integrated into an
international system. In a situation in which banks have cross-
border exposures in the form of assets in other countries, expo-
sures made more risky by the current mix of floating exchange
rates and fixed rates in certain regions (for example, the euro-
zone and associated member states of the European Union), the
present Basel Accord and European Commission Directives
would require capital ratios even higher than those required if
individual bank assets and liabilities were confined to only one
country—implying that companies would carry an even greater
debt load.
In such an internationally integrated financial system, banks
and economies would be much more effectively stabilized if
cross-border lending to the private sector were matched by a
commitment to lend, in the domestic currency of the bank, to
the government of the country in which that private sector is
based, in the event that lending to that country were reduced.
Thus, if a bank located, for example, in the United Kingdom
lends to companies in South Africa, the bank would commit
itself to lend to the South African government the equivalent of
any reduction in lending by the bank to those companies. In
this way, capital outflows would be matched by new capital
inflows to governments, which would then be in a position to
stabilize the foreign borrowing of banks and companies in their
respective countries. By eliciting increased commercial bank
lending to governments when lending to the private sector is
reduced, this requirement would provide a stabilizing mecha-
nism that would be endogenous to commercial bank lending.
This provision of an endogenous stabilizing mechanism con-
trasts with, but also facilitates and strengthens, the usual
Keynesian and post-Keynesian stabilizing mechanisms based on
government lender-of-last-resort strategies or fiscal intervention.
The government bonds thus issued to foreign banks should
be long term, or at least sufficiently long term to avoid repay-
ment pressures on issuing governments in the midst of a crisis.
Banks holding such foreign government bonds should be given
an option to sell them, after a given period, to a multilateral
monetary agency such as the International Monetary Fund at a
price mutually agreed upon. 
Such a system of advance, or contingent, lending commit-
ments would encourage due caution with regard to cross-border
lending, while stabilizing cross-border bank capital flows. It
would obviously be least taken up in countries with relatively
little private-sector foreign borrowing, such as some of the
major OECD countries. However, smaller countries and emerg-
ing, developing, and transitional economies, their banks, and
their companies could benefit from the greater stability that such
a system would bring. In this way, contingent commitments to
lend to governments in the event of private-sector lending with-
drawals would strengthen and stabilize the international financial
system as a whole.
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